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4OPINION OF THE COURT
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge.
Investors in Diagnostic Ventures, Inc., brought this class
action against multiple parties, alleging violations of § 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5.  These
interlocutory appeals under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f) present issues
at the intersection of class action procedure and the securities
laws.  The District Court granted plaintiffs’ motion for class
certification with respect to all defendants but one.  Parties from
both sides filed cross-appeals.  We will affirm. 
I.
Diagnostic Ventures, Inc., (DVI) was a healthcare
finance company that extended loans to medical providers to
facilitate the purchase of diagnostic medical equipment and
leasehold improvements, and offered lines of credit for working
capital secured by healthcare receivables.  Founded in 1986,
DVI was a publicly traded company with reported assets of $1.7
billion in 2003.  Its common stock began trading on the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in 1992.  It issued two tranches
of 9 7/8% senior notes:  the first, issued in 1997, totaled $100
million; the second, issued in 1998, totaled $55 million.  The
     1The extent of the Notes’ similarities is disputed by the
parties.  See infra n.15.
     2Cedar Street Fund is a limited partnership that invests in
small- and mid-cap stocks.  Cedar Street Offshore Fund is a
Cayman Islands tax-exempt company that invests in the same
manner as Cedar Street Fund.  According to the funds’
promotional materials, the minimum investment is $1 million.
Grossman was a managing member of and 50% shareholder in
Cedar Street Fund’s General Partner, SG Capital Management,
LLC, and a director of the offshore fund.  Plaintiffs’ investment
strategies and their relationship with DVI insiders are disputed,
5
Notes were similar,1 but the 1997 Notes were traded on the
NYSE, while the 1998 Notes were traded over the counter.
On August 13, 2003, DVI announced it would file for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection resulting from the public
disclosure of alleged misrepresentations or omissions as to the
amount and nature of collateral pledged to lenders.  In the
ensuing years, its common stock and 1997 Notes were de-listed
from the NYSE, the Securities and Exchange Commission and
Department of Justice undertook investigations, its former Chief
Financial Officer, Steven Garfinkel, pleaded guilty to fraud, the
bankruptcy trustee and multiple lenders filed lawsuits, and the
company dissolved.
On September 23, 2003, Cedar Street Fund, Cedar Street
Offshore Fund, and Kenneth Grossman2 filed a class action
and we discuss them in greater detail in Part II.B., infra.
     3The District Court appointed the three investors as lead
plaintiffs and consolidated various similar cases.
     4Other parties against whom plaintiffs allege a § 10(b) claim
in the Fifth Amended Complaint include: (1) officers and
directors of DVI; (2) Dolphin Medical Inc., PresGar Imaging,
LLC, OnCure Medical Corp., and Radnet Management, Inc.,
which were each closely associated with DVI; and (3) Merrill
Lynch & Co., Inc., a financial advisor to DVI, an underwriter in
many of its securitization transactions, and a substantial lender
to the company.  Plaintiffs also assert claims under § 20(a) of
the Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a), against DVI’s
officers and directors, Thomas Pritzker and other Pritzker family
members, and Pritzker Organization LLC, each of whom
allegedly exerted influence over DVI and/or its officers and
directors through their substantial holdings in DVI common
stock and Notes.  All the defendants other than Deloitte and
Clifford Chance have either settled their disputes or voluntarily
opted out of these appeals. 
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lawsuit alleging violations of federal securities laws.3  In their
Fifth Amended Complaint, plaintiffs assert claims under § 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and
the SEC’s Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, against multiple
defendants, of which only Deloitte & Touche LLP and Clifford
Chance LLP are involved in these appeals.4  Deloitte was DVI’s
certified public accountant from 1987 to June 2003.  Clifford
     5Unlike plaintiffs’ claims against Deloitte and other
defendants, which were asserted under Rule10b-5(a), (b), and
(c), Fifth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 493, 522, 541, their claims against
Clifford Chance are asserted only under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c),
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Chance served as the company’s lead corporate counsel,
particularly advising on disclosure obligations under federal
securities laws during the time period relevant to these appeals.
The Fifth Amended Complaint alleges that between
August 10, 1999, and August 13, 2003, defendants engaged in
a scheme designed to artificially inflate the price of DVI
securities by: (1) refusing to write down millions of dollars of
impaired assets; (2) double-pledging collateral and/or pledging
ineligible collateral; (3) refusing to implement internal controls
or to comply with those in place; and (4) concealing cash
shortages by overstating revenues, assets, and earnings, and
understating liabilities and expenses.  Fifth Am. Compl. ¶ 9.
Specifically, plaintiffs contend Deloitte committed securities
fraud by wrongfully issuing unqualified, or “clean,” audit
reports for fiscal years 1999 to 2002, hiding DVI’s improper
accounting practices, and declining to force the company to
disclose its fraudulent acts.  Id. ¶¶ 424–85, 537–57.  With
respect to Clifford Chance, plaintiffs contend the law firm
assisted DVI in its scheme by drafting fraudulent financial
reports (in particular, DVI’s 10-Q disclosure for the quarter
ending September 30, 2002), conspiring with other defendants
to hide material information about the company’s financial
condition, and deflecting inquiries from the SEC.5  Id. ¶¶
id. ¶ 560, which make it unlawful to “employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud,” and to “engage in any act,
practice, or course of business which operates . . . as a fraud,”
respectively, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.  We discuss the specific




Plaintiffs moved to certify a class under Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(3) on behalf of DVI investors who purchased securities
during the period in which the company allegedly made
misrepresentations.  The District Court granted plaintiffs’
motion with respect to all defendants but Clifford Chance.  The
court analyzed the Rule 23 prerequisites and concluded that each
was met.  Specifically, it found plaintiffs met Rule 23(b)(3)’s
predominance requirement by successfully invoking the fraud-
on-the-market presumption of reliance.  But the court found
plaintiffs were not entitled to a presumption of reliance with
respect to Clifford Chance because its conduct was not publicly
disclosed and it owed no duty of disclosure to DVI’s investors.
Therefore, individual issues predominated over common issues
and a class could not be certified against Clifford Chance.  The
court appointed lead plaintiffs as class representatives and
defined the class as:
All persons and entities who purchased or
otherwise acquired the securities of DVI, Inc.
(including its common stock and 9 7/8% Senior
     6The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. §
78aa and  28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We granted the Rule 23(f) petitions
and have jurisdiction to decide the merits of these interlocutory
appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e).
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Notes) between August 10, 1999 and August 13,
2003, inclusive and who were thereby damaged.
Excluded from the class are Defendants; any
entity in which a Defendant has a controlling
interest or is a part or subsidiary of, or is
controlled by a Defendant; the officers, directors,
legal representatives, heirs, predecessors,
successors and assigns of any of the Defendants;
Lead Plaintiffs named in WM High Yield Fund, et
al. v. O’Hanlon, et al., No. 04-CV-3423 (E.D.
Pa.).
Of the many defendants, initially, only Deloitte filed a
petition for leave to appeal.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f).  After the
District Court denied plaintiffs’ motion for partial
reconsideration of the court’s order with respect to Clifford
Chance, they too filed a petition for leave to appeal under Rule
23(f).6
To certify a class, the proposed class representative must
satisfy each of the four requirements in Rule 23(a)—numerosity,
commonality, typicality, and adequacy—and the putative class
action must meet the requirements of one of the subsections of
     7“We review a class certification order for abuse of
discretion.”  In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d
305, 312 (3d Cir. 2009).  “[A]buse of discretion . . . occurs if the
district court’s decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of
fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper application of
law to fact.  [W]hether an incorrect legal standard has been used
is an issue of law to be reviewed de novo.” Id. (citations and
quotations omitted); see Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 165 (3d Cir. 2001).  Factual
findings must be made by a preponderance of the evidence, and
a court must address issues relevant to the requirements even if
they overlap with the merits of the claim.  See Hydrogen
Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 316, 320; Newton, 259 F.3d at 168.
Accordingly, the court retains “broad discretion to control
proceedings and frame issues for consideration under Rule 23.”
Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 310. The district court must
supervise the process “‘to achieve the most effective balance
that expedites an informed certification determination without
forcing an artificial and ultimately wasteful division between
‘certification discovery’ and ‘merits discovery.’’” Id. at 319 n.20
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 Advisory Comm. note, 2003
amendments).
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Rule 23(b).7  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.  Plaintiffs seek certification
under Rule 23(b)(3), which requires that (1) “the questions of
law or fact common to class members predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members,” and (2) “that a
class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and
     8Some of Deloitte’s arguments to rebut the presumption of
reliance implicate typicality, and this is how the District Court
analyzed them.  See In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 249 F.R.D. 196,
202-03 (E.D. Pa. 2008).  On appeal, Deloitte limits its
arguments to the Rule 23(b) predominance requirement, and
does not contest the District Court’s typicality findings.
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efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”  Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(3).  These twin requirements are known as predominance
and superiority.
The only Rule 23 requirement raised on appeal is
predominance.8  Predominance requires that “[i]ssues common
to the class . . . predominate over individual issues . . . .”
Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 311 (quotation omitted).  Each
element of a claim is examined “through the prism” of Rule
23(b)(3).  Id.  “[T]he task for plaintiffs at class certification is to
demonstrate that the element of [the legal claim] is capable of
proof at trial through evidence that is common to the class rather
than individual to its members.”  Id. at 311–12.  Although the
requirement is “readily met in certain cases alleging consumer
or securities fraud or violations of the antitrust laws,” Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997) (citing
Advisory Comm. notes, 1966 amendments), “it does not follow
that a court should relax its certification analysis, or presume a
requirement for certification is met, merely because a plaintiff’s
claims fall within one of those substantive categories,”
Hydrogen Peroxide, 553 F.3d at 322. 
     9Section 10(b) makes it: 
unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
the use of any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange . . .
[t]o use or employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security . . . any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance
in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the Commission may prescribe as necessary and
appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j.  Under this statute, the SEC promulgated Rule
10b-5, which makes it unlawful:
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person,
12
Plaintiffs assert claims under § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5.9  The elements of a §
in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
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10(b) private action are: “(1) a material misrepresentation or
omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection
between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or
sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or
omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.”
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552
U.S. 148, 157 (2008).
The parties dispute the reliance element of plaintiffs’
claims.  Reliance, also known as transaction causation,
“establishes that but for the fraudulent misrepresentation, the
investor would not have purchased or sold the security.”
Newton, 259 F.3d at 172.  Reliance may be proven directly, but
“[r]equiring proof of individualized reliance from each member
of [a] proposed plaintiff class effectively would [prevent
plaintiffs] from proceeding with a class action, since individual
issues then would . . . overwhelm[] the common ones.”  Basic,
Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 242 (1988).  If reliance must be
individually proven, a proposed class cannot meet the Rule
23(b) predominance requirement. 
In order to facilitate securities class-actions, the Supreme
Court established a rebuttable presumption of class-wide
     10The Supreme Court established another presumption of
reliance in Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406
U.S. 128 (1972).  The Affiliated Ute presumption is generally
applicable only when material information is withheld from
investors by a defendant having an affirmative duty of
disclosure.  See id. at 153-54; Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 159. 
     11The weak form of the hypothesis assumes stock prices are
independent of past performance because the market’s valuation
of the security already includes all historical information; the
strong form of the hypothesis assumes stock prices reflect all
14
reliance based on the fraud-on-the-market theory.10  Id. at 245-
47.  “‘The fraud on the market theory is based on the hypothesis
that, in an open and developed securities market, the price of a
company’s stock is determined by the available material
information regarding the company and its business. . . .
Misleading statements will therefore defraud purchasers of stock
even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the misstatements.
. . .’”  Id. at 241-42 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154,
1160-61 (3d Cir. 1986)) (alteration in original).  This hypothesis
is known as the efficient capital market hypothesis.
The Supreme Court appears to have endorsed the semi-
strong version of the efficient capital market hypothesis.  See
Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2010); In re
PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1, 10 n.16 (1st Cir.
2005). That version assumes stock prices reflect all publicly
available information, but not privately held information.11  See
information, both private and public, such that even insiders
cannot outperform the market.  See Schleicher, 618 F.3d at 685.
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Schleicher, 618 F.3d at 685.  Accordingly, investors who buy or
sell securities at the price set by “an impersonal, well-developed
market” do so “in reliance on the integrity of that price.” Basic,
485 U.S. at 247.  “Because most publicly available information
is reflected in market price, an investor’s reliance on any public
material misrepresentations . . . may be presumed . . . .”  Id.
Thus, when the presumption of reliance is successfully invoked,
the predominance requirement is met with respect to the element
of reliance.
To invoke the fraud-on-the-market presumption of
reliance, plaintiffs must show they traded shares in an efficient
market, Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 178 (3d Cir.
2000), In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410,
1419 n.8 (3d Cir. 1997), and the misrepresentation at issue
became public, Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 159.  Once the
presumption of reliance is successfully invoked, the court
presumes “(1) that the market price of the security actually
incorporated the alleged misrepresentations, (2) that the plaintiff
actually relied on the market price of the security as an indicator
of its value, and (3) that the plaintiff acted reasonably in relying
on the market price of the security.”  Semerenko, 223 F.3d at
178-79.  But a defendant may rebut the presumption of reliance
by “[a]ny showing that severs the link between the alleged
misrepresentation and either the price received (or paid) by the
plaintiff, or his decision to trade at a fair market price . . . .”
     12Private securities complaints must “specify each statement
alleged to have been misleading [] [and] the reason or reasons
why the statement is misleading . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1).
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act codified the loss
causation element of a private securities cause of action,
requiring a plaintiff to “prov[e] that the act or omission of the
defendant alleged to violate [a federal securities law] caused the
loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages.”  15
U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4).  “[T]he general rules of pleading require
that the plaintiff also plead [loss causation] in his complaint.”
Teachers’ Ret. Sys. of La. v. Hunter, 477 F.3d 163, 185 (4th Cir.
2007).  The complaint must “not only state the allegations with
factual particularity, but . . . also describe the sources of
information with particularity, providing the who, what, when,
16
Basic, 485 U.S. at 248; see also Semerenko, 223 F.3d at 179
(“The fraud on the market theory of reliance . . . creates only a
presumption, which a defendant may rebut by raising any
defense to actual reliance.”).
Deloitte’s rebuttal arguments also implicate loss
causation, a distinct legal element of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
claims.  Loss causation is different from reliance and requires “a
causal connection between the material misrepresentation and
the loss.”  Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342
(2005); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (requiring a plaintiff in
a private securities action to “prov[e] that the act or omission of
the defendant alleged to violate [a federal securities law] caused
the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages”).12
where and how of the sources, as well as the who, what, when,
where and how of the information those sources convey.”
Institutional Investors Group v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 253
(3d Cir. 2009).
Complaints also must “state with particularity facts
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the
required state of mind.”  15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2).  “A complaint
will survive . . . only if a reasonable person would deem the
inference of scienter cogent and at least as compelling as any
opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged.”
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 324
(2007).
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Although a drop in a security’s price may be a result of the
correction of a previous misrepresentation, it may also have
been caused by “changed economic circumstances, changed
investor expectations, new industry-specific or firm-specific
facts, conditions, or other events.”  Dura, 544 U.S. at 343.
Therefore, at trial plaintiffs must “show that the revelation of
th[e] misrepresentation or omission was a substantial factor in
causing a decline in the security’s price, thus creating an actual
economic loss for the plaintiff.”  McCabe v. Ernst & Young,
LLP, 494 F.3d 418, 425-26 (3d Cir. 2007).  The requirement
ensures “that the individual allegedly responsible for the
misrepresentation or omission does not become an insurer
against all the risks associated with the investment.”  Id. at 425
n.3.
In adopting the rebuttable fraud-on-the-market
18
presumption of reliance in Basic, the Supreme Court injected
nascent economic theory into legal doctrine.  See Basic, 485
U.S. at 252-53 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).  As a consequence, there has been some “[c]onfusion and
contradiction in court rulings.”  Id. at 252.  These appeals
present several such tensions and contradictions.
II.
Deloitte challenges the District Court’s application of the
fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance and its finding that
predominance has been satisfied.  Deloitte also contends the
court’s factual findings on market efficiency were an abuse of
discretion and that loss causation—a distinct element of the
legal claims—must be established as a prerequisite before
invoking the presumption of reliance.  Finally, even if lead
plaintiffs successfully invoked the presumption of reliance,
Deloitte contends it has rebutted the presumption by
demonstrating individual, as opposed to common, issues of loss
causation predominate, and by demonstrating that plaintiffs
relied on a strategy crafted to exploit market inefficiencies.
A.
Market efficiency is the cornerstone of the fraud-on-the-
market presumption of reliance.  As noted, to invoke the
presumption of reliance, plaintiffs must show they traded
securities in an efficient market, Semerenko, 223 F.3d at 178,
Burlington, 114 F.3d at 1419 n.8, and the misrepresentations at
     13Deloitte does not dispute the alleged misrepresentations
became public.
     14The District court considered efficiency factors set forth in
Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1286-87 (D.N.J. 1989):
(1) the average weekly trading volume; (2) the number of
security analysts following and reporting on the security; (3) the
extent to which market makers traded the security; (4) the
issuer’s eligibility to file an SEC registration Form S-3; and (5)
the cause-and-effect relationship between material disclosures
and changes in the security’s price.  In analyzing DVI’s
common stock, the court also examined two factors set forth in
Krogman v. Sterritt, 202 F.R.D. 467, 478 (N.D. Tex. 2001): (1)
the company’s market capitalization; and (2) the size of the
19
issue became public, Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 159.13  Because
proof of an efficient market is required to invoke the
presumption of reliance, which in turn is necessary to meet the
Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement, a district court should
conduct a rigorous market efficiency analysis.  See Hydrogen
Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 309-310.  This may, in some cases,
include weighing conflicting expert testimony and making
factual findings.  Id. at 307, 323.
1.
The District Court examined plaintiffs’ and defendants’
expert reports and the parties’ arguments on market efficiency.
The court considered several factors14 in its analysis of DVI’s
public float for the security.  Finally, the court considered two
factors evaluated in In re Polymedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 453 F.
Supp. 2d 260, 273, 276-77 (D. Mass. 2006): (1) the ability to
short sell the security; and (2) the level of autocorrelation.
Three factors—market capitalization, public float, and short-
selling opportunities—were not considered with reference to the
two tranches of Notes because they are not applicable to debt
securities. 
     15The District Court also treated the two tranches—the 1997
and 1998 Notes—as one security for purposes of evaluating
whether they traded in efficient markets.  DVI, 249 F.R.D. at
214.  It found the tranches had identical terms, covenants, and
provisions.  Id.  Moreover, it credited the plaintiffs’ expert’s
report showing a 99.2% price correlation between the tranches.
Id.  The court recognized the price data for the 1998 Notes was
incomplete for part of the class period, but because this
information was publicly available for the 1997 Notes it applied
the 1997 price information to the 1998 Notes.  See id. at 214
n.32.  This finding was not clearly erroneous.  Accordingly, it
was not an abuse of discretion to treat the two tranches as one
security for the purposes of analyzing the efficiency of the
market.
The District Court analyzed the market in which the two
tranches of Notes were traded using many of the same factors it
20
three securities (common stock, the 1997 Notes, and the 1998
Notes),15 and concluded the market in which each traded was
applied to DVI’s common stock.  On the facts here, applying the
fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance to bond holders
was not clearly erroneous.  See In re Enron Corp. Sec.




On appeal, Deloitte challenges several findings of fact,
contending the court simply tallied efficiency factors rather than
engaging in a thoroughgoing market efficiency analysis.
Significantly, Deloitte contests the court’s findings about the
cause-and-effect relationships between public disclosures and
the securities’ price changes.  Plaintiffs, in turn, defend the
soundness of the District Court’s analysis and emphasize that
the listing of DVI’s common stock and 1997 Notes on the
NYSE weighs in favor of a finding of market efficiency. 
Securities markets like the NYSE and the NASDAQ are
“open and developed,” see Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 282
(3d Cir. 2000), and are therefore “well suited for application of
the fraud on the market theory,” Freeman v. Laventhol &
Horwath, 915 F.2d 193, 199 (6th Cir. 1990).  Accordingly, the
listing of a security on a major exchange such as the NYSE or
the NASDAQ weighs in favor of a finding of market efficiency.
See Oran, 226 F.3d at 282; see also  Schleicher, 618 F.3d at
682; Freeman, 915 F.2d at 199.  DVI securities, including its
common stock and its 1997 Notes, which the District Court held
were identical to the 1998 Notes, traded on the NYSE.
     16We have noted the Cammer factors may be instructive
depending on the circumstances.  See Hayes v. Gross, 982 F.2d
104, 107 n.1 (3d Cir. 1992).   Many of our sister circuits have
also approved of their use.  See Teamsters Local 445 Freight
Div. Pension Fund v. Bombardier, Inc., 546 F.3d 196, 204 n.11
(2d Cir. 2008) (accepting the use of the Cammer factors as an
“analytical tool” for determining market efficiency); In re
Xcelera.com Sec. Litig., 430 F.3d 503, 508 (1st Cir. 2005)
(affirming application of the Cammer factors); Unger v.
Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 323 (affirming application of
Cammer and Krogman factors); Gariety v. Grant Thornton,
LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 368 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing the Cammer
factors favorably); Binder v. Gillespie, 184 F.3d 1059, 1064-65
(9th Cir. 1999) (citing the Cammer factors with approval);
Freeman, 915 F.2d at 198-99 (citing the Cammer factors).
22
Other factors may be relevant to assessing market
efficiency, particularly when securities are traded in markets less
open and well-developed than those of the major exchanges, but
even for the major exchanges as well.  The type of security
(stocks, bonds, convertibles, derivatives, etc.), the company’s
industry, the security’s price, and other considerations should
guide district courts in deciding which factors are most relevant
to an efficiency analysis.16  However, because an efficient
market is one in which “information important to reasonable
investors . . . is immediately incorporated into stock prices,”
Burlington, 114 F.3d at 1425 (citation omitted), the cause-and-
effect relationship between a company’s material disclosures
     17This factor is related to, but broader than, loss causation.
In analyzing market efficiency, courts often look to all corporate
disclosures and news events.  Conversely, in analyzing loss
causation, courts generally look to corrective disclosures.
23
and the security price is normally the most important factor in an
efficiency analysis,17 see, e.g., Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1287.
Here, the District Court found causal relationships
between disclosures about DVI and its securities’ prices.  In
analyzing DVI’s common stock, the court examined an event
study conducted by plaintiffs’ expert, which found that, of the
34 days during the class period when DVI’s common stock saw
significant price changes, 20 of those days coincided with news
releases.  See DVI, 249 F.R.D. at 211.  The court held this
percentage established a sufficient causal relationship weighing
in favor of market efficiency.  See id. at 211-12.  In analyzing
DVI’s Notes, the court referenced plaintiffs’ event study that
employed the Option Adjusted Spread, which subtracts the risk-
free interest yield from the yield of the Notes, and found that on
17 of the 26 days (or 65% of the time) when the Notes’ yield
experienced a significant price change, a news disclosure also
occurred within two days.  See id. at 215-16.  The court found
this factor supported a finding of market efficiency for both the
stock and the Notes.
On appeal, Deloitte makes two primary arguments related
to cause-and-effect.  First, it contests whether 60% and 65%
correlations between news releases and price changes in DVI
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common stock and Notes, respectively, demonstrate an efficient
market.  The District Court credited two studies offered by
plaintiffs, which found that on average “only about one-third of
statistically significant changes in the stock price of publicly
traded companies are actually associated with identifiable news
or events.”  DVI, 249 F.R.D. at 212.  Here, the correlation was
at least twice as high.  The District Court’s factual findings that
60% and 65% correlations between news releases and price
changes in DVI stock and Notes weigh in favor of market
efficiency were not clearly erroneous.
Deloitte also contends the market price reacted too
slowly to news releases about DVI to demonstrate efficiency.
The court found that although DVI’s stock price sometimes took
up to two days to incorporate new information, “on the vast
majority of occasions the information was incorporated into the
stock price on the same day.”  DVI, 249 F.R.D. at 211.  Deloitte
contends this is insufficient to demonstrate market efficiency.
We have addressed the speed with which information is
incorporated into market price and explained that because a
perfectly efficient market is not attainable, cf., Peil, 806 F.2d at
1161 n.10 (describing the market in information as “nearly
perfect”), we do not require that public information be absorbed
“instantaneously,” In re Merck & Co. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 261,
269 (3d Cir. 2005).   Applying this standard, we have held that
a market is inefficient when a price does not decrease within
four days following an alleged corrective disclosure.  See Oran,
226 F.3d at 283 (price increased for several days following the
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disclosure); see also Merck, 432 F.3d at 269 (same).  Here, the
District Court found most of the information was incorporated
into the price within one day.  That some information took two
days to affect the price does not undermine a finding of
efficiency.  The District Court’s finding that cause-and- effect
weighs in favor of a finding of market efficiency was not clearly
erroneous.
In sum, the District Court weighed efficiency factors
involving the markets in which DVI’s common stock and senior
Notes traded.  Granting weight to the listing of DVI’s stock and
Notes on the NYSE, and to the cause-and-effect relationships
between news releases and DVI’s securities’ prices, the court
concluded that each market was efficient.  The legal standards
it used to evaluate efficiency were proper, its factual findings
were not clearly erroneous, and its weighing of the factors was
not an abuse of discretion.  Accordingly, the court did not abuse
its discretion in permitting plaintiffs to invoke the fraud-on-the-
market presumption of reliance.
2.
Deloitte urges us to adopt the view that plaintiffs must
prove loss causation at the class certification stage in order to
invoke the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance.  See
Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d
261, 269 (5th Cir. 2007); see also Archdiocese of Milwaukee
Supporting Fund v. Halliburton Co., 597 F.3d 330, 335 (5th Cir.
2010), cert. granted sub nom. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v.
Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 856 (2011); Fener v. Operating
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Eng’rs Constr. Indus. and Misc. Pension Fund (LOCAL 66), 579
F.3d 401, 410 (5th Cir. 2009).  “Loss causation demonstrates
that the fraudulent misrepresentation actually caused the loss
suffered.”  Newton, 259 F.3d at 173.  In Oscar, the court
explained that “because loss causation speaks to the semi-strong
efficient market hypothesis on which classwide reliance
depends,” it relates to the presumption of reliance.  See Oscar,
487 F.3d at 269.   Thus, Oscar connected loss causation and the
fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance “through the lens
of market efficiency.”  See John R. Guenard, Oscar Private
Equity Investments v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc.:  The Fifth
Circuit Requires Proof of Loss Causation to Trigger the Fraud-
on-the-Market Presumption of Reliance, 82 Tul. L. Rev. 2467,
2472 (2008).
The Oscar court’s analysis hinged on the relationship
between loss causation and market impact.  Market impact is the
effect of a disclosure on the market price.  In an efficient
market, every material disclosure should be reflected in the
market price.  Market impact is necessary to prove loss
causation because a misrepresentation that does not move the
market price is incapable of causing a loss.  Cf. Dura, 544 U.S.
at 343.  But market impact alone is insufficient to demonstrate
loss causation.  Investors must go beyond a correlation between
market movement and disclosure to demonstrate the injurious
price impact was caused by the material misrepresentation at
issue rather than by some other intervening cause or causes that
“taken separately or together account for some or all of that
lower price.”  Id. 
     18In most cases, unmoored from the presumption of reliance,
loss causation is unlikely to defeat class certification because it
is generally susceptible of class-wide proof.  See Hydrogen
Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 311-12; Schleicher, 618 F.3d at 686-87.
For purposes of class certification, plaintiffs must show
evidence relating to the element of loss causation is common to
the entire class, but do not need to prove loss causation itself.
A trial court will have to “pin down when the stock’s price was
affected by any fraud,” but “[t]hat decision . . . can be made on
a class-wide basis, because it affects investors in common.”
Schleicher, 618 F.3d at 687. 
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In Oscar, the court explained that because the fraud-on-
the-market presumption of reliance requires an efficient market,
and a disclosure that does not result in a price change suggests
an inefficient market, market impact, and therefore loss
causation, must go to the core of the reliance requirement.18  See
487 F.3d at 269.  Believing that Basic “allows each of the
circuits room to develop its own fraud-on-the-market rules,” id.
at 264 (citation omitted), the court held plaintiffs must establish
loss causation at the class certification stage as a prerequisite to
invoking the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance, id. at
269.
 Oscar appears to shift the burdens announced in Basic,
undermining the purpose of the presumption of reliance.  See In
re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d 474, 483 (2d
Cir. 2008).  We do not think plaintiffs must establish loss
causation as a prerequisite to invoking the presumption of
     19In Newton, an atypical securities fraud action, we upheld a
denial of class certification because the plaintiffs could not meet
the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement—plaintiffs were
unable to demonstrate injury using class-wide proof.  See
Newton, 259 F.3d at 192-93.  The plaintiff investors in Newton
alleged defendant brokers executed ordered trades at the
National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO) price even though lower
prices were available using private services.  See id. at 170.
Plaintiffs contended defendants traded at the higher prices to
intentionally inflate their profit margins, and that defendants
engaged in “crossing” transactions between sellers and buyers
in order to capture the spread between the NBBO and a more
favorable price as their fee.  Id.  We explained that the alleged
fraud was an atypical securities fraud stating, “plaintiffs’ claims
do not involve an omission or misrepresentation that affected the
value of a security in an efficient market.  Therefore, a
presumption of reliance based on this theory would be
inappropriate.”  Id. at 175-76.
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reliance in the first instance.19  Accordingly, we decline to
require plaintiffs to demonstrate loss causation at class
certification.  See Schleicher, 618 F.3d at 687; Salomon, 544
F.3d at 483.
B.
Once established, the presumption of reliance may be
rebutted by “any defense to actual reliance.”  Semerenko, 223
F.3d at 179; see Basic, 485 U.S. at 248.  The Supreme Court
     20In Basic, the Court explained in a footnote:
We note there may be a certain incongruity
between the assumption that Basic shares are
traded on a well-developed, efficient, and
information-hungry market, and the allegation
that such a market could remain misinformed, and
its valuation of Basic shares depressed, for 14
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provided a non-exhaustive list of ways that defendants can rebut
the presumption, including by showing: (1) the market did not
respond to the alleged misrepresentations; (2) the
misrepresentations were immaterial; (3) a plaintiff did not
actually rely on the misrepresentations; or (4) a plaintiff would
have sold the securities without relying on the integrity of the
market.  See Basic, 485 U.S. at 248-49; Semerenko, 223 F.3d at
179.  Deloitte contends rebuttal of the presumption of reliance
must be considered at the class certification stage, and, further,
that it has rebutted the presumption of reliance in this case
because it has shown lead plaintiffs cannot establish loss
causation for the entire class, and because lead plaintiffs relied
on a strategy of exploiting inefficiencies in the small-cap market
bolstered by receipt of inside information from DVI.
In a recent opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit interpreted Basic to mean “that a successful rebuttal
defeats certification by defeating the Rule 23(b)(3)
predominance requirement.  Hence, the court must permit
defendants to present their rebuttal arguments before certifying
a class . . . .”20  Salomon, 544 F.3d at 485 (quotation and citation
months, on the basis of three public statements.
Proof of that sort is a matter for trial, throughout
which the District Court retains the authority to
amend the certification order as may be
appropriate.  Thus, we see no need to engage in
the kind of factual analysis the dissent suggests
that manifests the “oddities” of applying a
rebuttable presumption of reliance in this case.
485 U.S. at 249 n.29.  This footnote appears to have responded
to the dissent in Basic and was not essential to Basic’s holding.
See id. at 259-63 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (discussing the factual peculiarities of the trades in issue).
Taken literally, note 29 may even appear to preclude a court
from evaluating evidence presented by a defendant at class
certification to demonstrate the market is inefficient.  But this
widespread practice is permitted even in circuits that do not
allow the examination of rebuttal evidence at the class
certification stage.  See, e.g., Polymedica, 432 F.3d at 17-19.
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omitted).  The Second Circuit heeded defendants’ request to
“attempt to rebut the fraud-on-the-market presumption” with
evidence “that the market price was not affected by the alleged
misstatements,” id., by vacating the district court’s opinion and
holding that defendants have the burden “to show that the
allegedly false or misleading material statements did not
measurably impact the market price of the security,” id. at 486
n.9.
 Evidence an allegedly corrective disclosure did not
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affect the market price undermines the fraud-on-the-market
presumption of reliance for several reasons.  “An efficient
market for good news is an efficient market for bad news.”
Merck, 432 F.3d at 271.  A demonstration the market did not
assimilate information about the security into the market
price—either when the alleged misrepresentation occurred, or
when an alleged corrective disclosure occurred—may undercut
the general claim of market efficiency or demonstrate market
inefficiency relating to the securities in issue.
Even if a plaintiff could establish the market was efficient
notwithstanding a lack of market impact, under our precedents
the lack of market impact may indicate the misstatements were
immaterial—a distinct basis for rebuttal.  See Semerenko, 223
F.3d at 179 n.7.  When a plaintiff alleges securities traded in an
efficient market, we have held information immaterial as a
matter of law if that information did not affect the security’s
price.  See Burlington, 114 F.3d at 1425; Oran, 226 F.3d at 283;
Merck, 432 F.3d at 269.  In an otherwise efficient market, the
failure of a corrective disclosure to affect the market price may
therefore serve as a rebuttal to the presumption of reliance
because it renders the misstatement immaterial as a matter of
law.
Accordingly, we believe rebuttal of the presumption of
reliance falls within the ambit of issues that, if relevant, should
be addressed by district courts at the class certification stage.
The District Court here did not err in evaluating Deloitte’s
rebuttal arguments.  Moreover, we agree with the Second Circuit
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that a defendant’s successful rebuttal demonstrating that
misleading material statements or corrective disclosures did not
affect the market price of the security defeats the presumption
of reliance for the entire class, thereby defeating the Rule 23(b)
predominance requirement.
1.
Deloitte contends on appeal that it has rebutted the
presumption of reliance by showing plaintiffs cannot
demonstrate loss causation for all class members.  But Deloitte
does not argue or demonstrate the alleged corrective disclosures
did not affect the market price.  Instead, Deloitte contends  some
“in-and-out” traders—investors who sold their securities before
the first alleged corrective disclosure—suffered no loss and
therefore loss causation cannot be shown for those traders
rebutting the presumption of reliance.  On these facts, we
disagree.
 As previously discussed, loss causation considered
separate and apart from the presumption of reliance will rarely
defeat the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement because the
evidence used to prove loss causation in fraud-on-the-market
cases is often common to the class.  See Hydrogen Peroxide,
552 F.3d at 311-12.  This is the case where, as here, the parties’
dispute surrounding loss causation centers on the determination
of the date of a corrective disclosure or disclosures.  See
Schleicher, 618 F.3d at 686-87.  Moreover, a plaintiff need not
demonstrate loss causation as a prerequisite to invoking the
fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance.  See Part II.A.2
     21The District Court, ruling on a motion for summary
judgment, subsequently held the September 25, 2002, May 13,
2002, June 5-6, 2003, and July 16, 2003, disclosures were not
corrective disclosures as a matter of law.
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supra.  But evidence introduced by a defendant at the class
certification stage demonstrating an allegedly corrective
disclosure did not move the market—that there was no market
impact and therefore no loss causation—may in some
circumstances rebut the presumption of reliance and in turn
defeat predominance.
The parties dispute whether the first alleged corrective
disclosure occurred on August 13, 2003, the day DVI announced
it would file for bankruptcy protection, or on some earlier date
going back to and possibly preceding May 20, 2003, the day
Deloitte resigned as DVI’s certified public accountant.21  Before
the District Court, Deloitte briefed this issue as a class definition
issue and not as a rebuttal to the presumption of reliance.  Citing
Dura, the court recognized that persons who sold their securities
before the first corrective disclosure would face a difficult task
of establishing damages and therefore also of loss causation, but
declined to narrow the class dates, holding this a factual
question that need not be addressed at the class certification
stage.  DVI, 249 F.R.D. at 219.  The District Court certified the
class to include “[a]ll persons and entities who purchased or
otherwise acquired the securities of DVI . . . between August 10,
1999 and August 13, 2003, inclusive and who were thereby
damaged.”  In oral argument before the District Court,
     22As a preliminary matter, we note the issue of which
individuals and entities are included in the putative class is
primarily relevant to class definition.  Here, the in-and-out
traders referenced by Deloitte are excluded from the class,
which is limited by its plain terms to individuals or entities who
were damaged by their purchases.  We question whether the
District Court conformed with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(B),
requiring trial courts granting a motion for class certification to
“define the class and the class claims, issues, or defenses . . . .”
We recently held this rule, which was part of the 2003
amendments to Rule 23, created an affirmative duty for district
courts to include a “readily discernable, clear, and complete list
of the claims, issues or defenses to be treated on a class basis.”
Wachtel v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 453 F.3d 179, 187-88
(3d Cir. 2006).  But Deloitte did not raise the issue of proper
class definition on appeal.  Accordingly, we will not reach it.
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supplemental filings with the District Court, and now on appeal,
Deloitte contends the occurrence of these in-and-out trades
within the class period rebuts the presumption of reliance and
defeats predominance because some traders may have suffered
no loss and therefore would be unable to demonstrate loss
causation.22
At bottom, Deloitte urges us once again, albeit under a
different legal theory, to require the District Court to rule on the
earliest date a corrective disclosure occurred—a ruling that on
its face does not implicate predominance because it would be
made using evidence common to the class.  See Hydrogen
     23Deloitte attempts to recast a claim about
damages—loss—to one about loss causation.  See Newton, 259
F.3d at 177 (“it is necessary . . . to separate the concept of
economic loss from the issue of loss causation.”).  Outside of its
rebuttal arguments, Deloitte does not contest the sufficiency of
proof of damages for the purposes of class certification.  This is
unsurprising since, as a typical securities fraud action where
“the plaintiff shareholder alleges that a fraudulent
misrepresentation or omission has artificially inflated the price
35
Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 311-12.  Deloitte attempts to frame this as
a predominance problem by inserting the issue into the
presumption of reliance framework.  But Deloitte has not carried
its evidentiary burden on rebuttal.
Although Basic permits rebuttal of the presumption of
reliance, it places the burden of rebuttal on defendants.  See
Basic, 485 U.S. at 248.  We have held “[g]enuine disputes with
respect to the Rule 23 requirements must be resolved, after
considering all the relevant evidence submitted by the parties.”
Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 324.  Here, Deloitte offers no
evidence in support of its rebuttal argument—it merely notes the
transcript of oral argument of the certification motion where it
raised this issue before the District Court with reference to class
definition.  Before the District Court, and now on appeal,
Deloitte provides no evidence about the prevalence of in-and-
out trades during the class period or about the identity of traders
whose only trades were in-and-out transactions.  Accordingly,
Deloitte has not met its burden.23
of a publicly-traded security, with the plaintiff investing in
reliance on the misrepresentation or omission,” McCabe, 494
F.3d at 425, damages as well as loss causation are susceptible of
determination through evidence common to the class, see
Newton, 259 F.3d at 180.  Deloitte’s rebuttal argument here is
simply that class-wide loss causation cannot be proven if some
investors sustained no damages.  This does not bear on market
efficiency generally, or with reference to the specific
misrepresentations.  It does not demonstrate immateriality, nor
does it undercut actual reliance or speak to the reasonableness
of reliance.  Cf. Semerenko, 223 F.3d at 178-79.
     24Deloitte initially introduced this rebuttal evidence before
the District Court in the context of the Rule 23(a) typicality
requirement.  If a unique defense might “play a major role in the
litigation,” there is a risk that absent class members will suffer
if class representatives do not focus on concerns common to the
class.  See Beck v. Maximus, Inc., 457 F.3d 291, 300 (3d Cir.
2006).  The District Court analyzed defendants’ rebuttal
arguments under this framework, and concluded that they would
not become “a major focus of the litigation.”  See DVI, 249
F.R.D. at 202.  This was not an abuse of discretion.  On appeal,
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2.
Defendants also introduced rebuttal evidence before the
District Court contending that lead plaintiffs relied on non-
public information rather than on the integrity of the market
price.24  On appeal, Deloitte reiterates its argument that lead
Deloitte raises these issues solely in the context of the Rule
23(b) predominance requirement.
     25Some access to company management is permissible
because it facilitates the dissemination of publicly available
company news, and is often inevitable when institutional
investors are taking large equity stakes in companies.  See In re
WorldCom Inc. Sec. Litig., 219 F.R.D. 267, 282 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (“[Institutional] investors are likely to use advisors, to
invest conservatively in securities they consider undervalued by
the market, and on occasion even to communicate directly with
the company in which they are investing to verify or better
evaluate its public disclosures.  Making careful investment
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plaintiffs’ investment strategy was to capitalize on inefficiencies
in the small-cap market by trading securities it believed, based
on public information and information received from DVI, were
incorrectly priced.  In essence, Deloitte argues that because
plaintiffs hoped to be successful arbitrageurs they could not
have relied on the integrity of the market price and the
presumption of reliance is therefore rebutted defeating
predominance.
The District Court examined and rejected evidence that
lead plaintiffs relied on inside information from DVI in making
trades.  Before the District Court, Deloitte contended research
notes taken by or attributed to Kenneth Grossman demonstrated
lead plaintiffs’ receipt of material non-public information from
DVI management on numerous occasions,25 which were
decisions does not disqualify an investor . . . from relying on the
presumption of reliance . . . .”); cf. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-
1(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I) (instructing district courts to appoint as lead
plaintiff the “person or group of persons that . . . has the largest
financial interest in the relief sought by the class . . . .”). 
     26The District Court applied these factual findings to the Rule
23(a) typicality requirement, which Deloitte does not contest on
appeal, but they are equally applicable in the present
predominance challenge. 
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correlated with lead plaintiffs’ trades in DVI securities.  The
court reviewed plaintiffs’ comparison of the description of each
research note with information publicly available as of the date
of the research note, and made a factual finding “that the
communications from DVI insiders were either immaterial or
publicly available, having been disclosed through public
conference calls, press releases, SEC filings or other publicly
available materials.”  DVI, 249 F.R.D. at 202.  The court
additionally noted that only two of the numerous research notes
Deloitte contended reflected non-public information were
correlated with lead plaintiffs’ purchase of DVI securities.  Id.
Our review of the record demonstrates that these factual findings
were not clearly erroneous.26 
Because Deloitte has not proffered evidence lead
plaintiffs received and traded on material, non-public,
information, Deloitte’s contention is limited to the naked
argument that evidence an investor believes successful arbitrage
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is possible rebuts the presumption of reliance.  Deloitte
essentially argues that a subjective belief the market is not
perfectly efficient is sufficient to demonstrate plaintiffs did not
rely on the integrity of the market price.  In support, Deloitte
cites Zlotnick v. Tie Communications, 836 F.2d 818 (3d Cir.
1988), an appeal from a motion to dismiss in which we held that
certain short-selling investors in defendants’ company could not
invoke a presumption of reliance.  Deloitte urges us to expand
Zlotnick’s narrow holding to the facts here—namely that
plaintiffs sought to exploit temporary informational
inefficiencies in the market to purchase undervalued securities
they expected to rise in price as the market digested relevant
public information.  Zlotnick does not stand for such a broad
proposition—its holding is limited to the applicability of the
fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance in a short-selling
context—a complex and controversial issue that is not before us.
 See 836 F.2d at 823.
In Basic, the Court explained that “a free and open public
market” is based on “a situation where the market price reflects
as nearly as possible a just price.”  485 U.S. at 246 (quotation
omitted).  The Court went on to explain that “most publicly
available information is reflected in market price,” and “[a]n
investor who buys or sells stock at the price set by the market
does so in reliance on the integrity of that price.”  Id. at 247.
We read Basic to mean that an investor who seeks to use the
fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance must show reliance
on publicly available information in making the investment
decision regardless of the investor’s personal belief as to the
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security’s value.  Reliance on the “integrity of the market price,”
id., means only that an investor relies on the fact that the price
reflects publicly available information as the market digests it,
and nothing more.  The careful research of sophisticated
institutional investors, who are preferred as class
representatives, see 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I),
constitutes an important means by which publicly available
information becomes incorporated into market prices.  See
WorldCom, 219 F.R.D. at 282.  Here, plaintiffs adequately
demonstrated the markets for DVI securities were
efficient—that is, they absorbed publicly available information
about DVI and reflected it in the securities’ prices.  Defendants
have not made an adequate showing that plaintiffs relied on
anything other than publicly available information obtained
through careful research that is commonplace among
sophisticated institutional investors.  Deloitte’s rebuttal is
therefore unavailing.  Plaintiffs are entitled to a presumption of
reliance.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we will affirm
the order of the District Court.
III.
Plaintiffs appeal the District Court’s denial of class
certification with respect to Clifford Chance.  Because this
appeal raises different issues than those presented in Deloitte’s
appeal, a brief summary of the factual allegations may be
helpful.  On October 11, 2002, Deloitte issued a Management
Letter in connection with its annual audit of DVI.  The letter
     27The term workaround was used by CFO Garfinkel in his
affidavit.  The specifics of the workaround are complicated, but
in essence Healy’s alleged plan was to take advantage of a
loophole in SOX by conducting a “special audit” of DVI’s
internal controls during the two-week period following the
issuance of the Management Letter, but before the deadline for
filing the 10-Q.  The audit was meant to show there were no
material weaknesses in DVI’s internal controls, which allowed
DVI to avoid disclosure to the SEC under the SOX guidelines.
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identified material weaknesses in DVI’s internal controls for
monitoring non-performing assets and assessing impaired loans.
Deloitte informed DVI that federal securities laws—the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116
Stat. 745, in particular—required disclosure of these weaknesses
in DVI’s next Form 10-Q.  According to plaintiffs, disclosing
this information would have forced DVI to write down millions
of dollars of assets and reverse income accrued on impaired
loans.  DVI initially prepared a portion of the 10-Q for the
quarter ending September 30, 2002, revealing the material
weaknesses and faxed it to John Healy, a partner at Clifford
Chance.  Healy allegedly directed DVI not to release that
version of the 10-Q.  Instead, according to plaintiffs, Healy
devised a “workaround” scheme to avoid having to disclose the
weaknesses.27  The parties dispute Clifford Chance’s role in
     28Clifford Chance devotes a significant portion of its reply
brief to contesting plaintiffs’ factual allegations.  It contends
there is no evidence showing Healy believed the Management
Letter needed to be disclosed, or that any attorney at Clifford
Chance drafted the 10-Q.  The record appears to present some
evidence to the contrary, but regardless, the resolution of these
factual disputes is more appropriate at a merits stage of the
proceeding.  At this point, we are concerned only with whether
plaintiffs’ claims involve common questions of law and fact.
See Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 311-12.  Because plaintiffs’
allegation that Clifford Chance created the misleading 10-Q is
inherently common to all members of the class, we need not
delve into the likelihood of success on the merits.
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drafting the misleading portions of the 10-Q,28 but they do not
dispute that the final version did not state there were material
weaknesses in DVI’s internal controls.
The Fifth Amended Complaint asserts violations of Rule
10b-5(a) and (c), but not Rule 10b-5(b), against Clifford
Chance.  Fifth Am. Compl. ¶ 560.  As noted, subsections (a) and
(c) make fraudulent conduct unlawful; subsection (a) makes it
unlawful “[t]o employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud,” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a); subsection (c) makes it
unlawful “[t]o engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud,” id. § 240.10b-5(c).
In contrast, subsection (b) makes it unlawful “[t]o make any
untrue statement of material fact” or to omit a material fact
necessary to clarify prior misleading statements.  Id. § 240.10b-
     29We refer to claims under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) as “scheme
liability claims” because they make deceptive conduct
actionable, as opposed to Rule 10b-5(b), which relates to
deceptive statements.
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5(b).  Consequently, the District Court only addressed plaintiffs’
scheme liability claims under subsections (a) and (c).29  It
explained:  “Lead Plaintiffs do not allege that Clifford Chance
directly made any public misstatements that affected the market
for DVI securities.  Instead, Lead Plaintiffs argue that Clifford
Chance should be held liable under section 10(b) because it
participated in a scheme to defraud investor[s] in DVI.”  DVI,
249 F.R.D. at 217.  The Court proceeded to analyze plaintiffs’
scheme liability allegations under Stoneridge, which was also a
scheme liability case, not a misstatement case.
As discussed in Part II.A. supra, to invoke the fraud-on-
the-market presumption of reliance, plaintiffs must show they
traded securities in an efficient market, Semerenko, 223 F.3d at
178, Burlington, 114 F.3d at 1419 n.8, and the
misrepresentations at issue became public, Stoneridge, 552 U.S.
at 159.  Here, because “none of [Clifford Chance’s] alleged
conduct was publicly disclosed such that it affected the market
for DVI’s securities,” DVI, 249 F.R.D. at 218, the District Court
concluded that plaintiffs could not utilize the fraud-on-the-
market presumption.  Plaintiffs filed a motion for
reconsideration, contending that Stoneridge created a
“remoteness test” for establishing scheme liability, and that
Clifford Chance’s involvement in the alleged scheme was
     30On appeal, plaintiffs also assert Clifford Chance is liable
under Rule 10b-5(b) for actually making misstatements with
respect to the aforementioned 10-Q.  Presumably, this argument
was made to circumvent Stoneridge, which was decided while
the class certification motion was sub judice.  Plaintiffs urge us
to adopt a broad definition of what constitutes “mak[ing] any
untrue statement of a material fact” under this subsection.  See
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b).  They rely primarily on a vacated
panel opinion from our Court, which held that an actor can be
primarily liable when he knowingly or recklessly plays such a
substantial role in the creation of the statement that he could be
said to be the author of that statement.  See Klein v. Boyd, Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P90, 136 (3d Cir. Feb. 12, 1998), vacated,
reh’g granted, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P90, 165 (3d Cir. Mar.
9, 1998).  The panel adopted this standard, known as the
“creator” test, from an amicus brief filed by the SEC.  Klein was
vacated pending a rehearing en banc that did not occur because
the case settled.
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substantial enough to create primary liability.  The court rejected
this argument, holding that Stoneridge did not create such a test.
Order on Lead Pls.’ Mot. for Partial Recons. at 5-6 (Aug. 27,
2008).
On appeal, plaintiffs renew their arguments.  They also
argue Clifford Chance’s deceptive conduct was communicated
to the public, and that Stoneridge only requires public
dissemination of the fraudulent acts, not public attribution of the
acts to a particular defendant.30
Plaintiffs waived their Rule 10b-5(b) theory of recovery
when they failed to raise it before the District Court.  See Srein
v. Frankford Trust Co., 323 F.3d 214, 224 n.8 (3d Cir. 2003)
(“we will not consider issues that are raised for the first time on
appeal absent compelling reasons.” (quotation omitted)).
Plaintiffs’ argue the law firm was put on notice that it could be
held primarily liable for misrepresentations under all three
subsections of Rule 10b-5, see Lead Pls.’ Reply Br. at 14; Lead
Pls.’ Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Leave to Supp. the Rec. at 2,
and that they should not be precluded from refining class
members’ claims in the aftermath of Stoneridge because it was
a groundbreaking decision.  Reply in Supp. of Mot. 4 n.2.
Although the Fifth Amended Complaint asserts that Clifford
Chance participated in the drafting of DVI’s 10-Q, it does not
aver that the firm actually made a misrepresentation except as a
predicate for the scheme liability allegations.  Fifth Am. Compl.
¶¶ 562–63.  Throughout the District Court proceedings,
plaintiffs focused only on their scheme liability claim.  Plaintiffs
cite a brief they submitted to the District Court in response to
Clifford Chance’s notice of Stoneridge to show they asserted a
misrepresentation claim under Rule 10b-5(b).  Though the brief
argued that Clifford Chance drafted and instigated the actionable
disclosures made by DVI, it did so only in the context of
asserting a scheme liability claim.  See Lead Pls.’ Resp. to
Clifford Chance’s Notice of Recent Authority Regarding Class
Cert. at 14 (“Lead Plaintiffs have established reliance with
respect to Clifford’s actionable deceptive conduct consistent
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with Stoneridge.”).  Accordingly, we will not reach this issue.
Plaintiffs also contend the Affiliated Ute presumption of
reliance—a presumption that can be invoked when a duty to
disclose material information has been breached, see 406 U.S.
at 153-54—applies because Clifford Chance had a duty to
disclose the material weaknesses under the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (MRPC).  In their motion for class
certification, plaintiffs argued they were entitled to a
presumption of reliance under Affiliated Ute because Clifford
Chance withheld material information regarding the 10-Q from
DVI’s investors.  See 406 U.S. at 153-54.  The District Court
rejected this argument, explaining that the firm did not have a
duty to disclose this information to investors.  On appeal,
plaintiffs now argue the law firm had a duty to disclose under
the MRPC, which would trigger the Affiliated Ute presumption.
For the same reasons we decline to consider plaintiffs’
misrepresentation claim, we will not address their MRPC
argument.  Indeed, unlike their misrepresentation claim, which
plaintiffs contend they alluded to throughout the District Court
proceedings, the MRPC claim is nowhere to be found in the
record.
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Our analysis of plaintiffs’ scheme liability claims is
guided by a number of Supreme Court decisions.  In 1971, the
Court found a private right of action to be implicit in § 10(b) and
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Rule 10b-5.  See Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life
& Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).  It has subsequently
clarified the scope of this implied right and the contours of the
elements necessary to establish a prima facie case.  See, e.g.,
Basic, 485 U.S. at 231-32 (defining the element of materiality
in a § 10(b) action); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222
(1980) (requiring a fiduciary relationship between a person and
a company to hold that person liable for failing to disclose
material non-public information before trading on it); Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (requiring scienter to
succeed in a private action under § 10(b)); Santa Fe Indus., Inc.
v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (refusing to extend § 10(b) to
cover “transactions which constitute no more than internal
corporate mismanagement”); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (confining a private Rule 10b-5
action to actual purchasers or sellers).
More than twenty years after Superintendent, the Court
resolved uncertainty regarding from whom plaintiff-investors
can recover in securities fraud actions, restricting the scope of
private actions under the statute.  It held that “a private plaintiff
may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit under § 10(b).”
Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994).  But the Court tempered the
scope of its decision, explaining the holding “does not mean that
secondary actors in the securities markets are always free from
liability under the securities Acts.”  Id.
Any person or entity, including a lawyer,
     31After Central Bank, Congress amended the Exchange Act
to permit the SEC to bring enforcement actions against any
person that “knowingly provides substantial assistance to
another person in violation of [the Act],” PSLRA, Pub. L. No.
104-67, § 104, 109 Stat. 737, 757 (codified in 15 U.S.C. §
78t(e)), but did not reverse the Court’s holding with respect to
private actions.
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accountant, or bank, who employs a manipulative
device or makes a material misstatement (or
omission) on which a purchaser or seller of
securities relies may be liable as a primary
violator under 10b-5, assuming all of the
requirements for primary liability under Rule 10b-
5 are met.
Id.
Two issues have arisen in private litigation following
Central Bank.31  First, there is uncertainty among the circuits as
to how to differentiate primary and secondary liability.
Compare Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. v. Mayer Brown LLP (Refco), 603
F.3d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[A] secondary actor can be held
liable . . . only for false statements attributed to the secondary-
actor defendant at the time of dissemination.”), and Ziemba v.
Cascade Int’l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1205 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[I]n
order for the defendant to be primarily liable under § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5, the alleged misstatement or omission upon which a
plaintiff relied must have been publicly attributable to the
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defendant at the time that the plaintiff’s investment decision was
made.”), with Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1061
n.5 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[S]ubstantial participation or intricate
involvement in the preparation of fraudulent statements is [a]
ground[] for primary liability even though that participation
might not lead to the actor’s actual making of the statements.”).
Second, during the past fifteen years, many plaintiffs
have also advanced “scheme liability” claims under Rule 10b-
5(a) and (c) to reach secondary actors, who may have been
integrally involved in furthering the fraudulent scheme, but who
made no public statements.  The essence of these claims is that
even though secondary actors may not themselves have made
actionable misrepresentations, they are nevertheless liable for
primary violations of § 10(b) through their deceptive acts.  This
was the issue in Stoneridge, where plaintiffs, purchasers of
common stock in Charter Communications, Inc., alleged that
Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola, vendors of Charter, knowingly
entered into sham transactions with Charter that allowed the
company to book fictitious revenues.  552 U.S. at 154-55.
Liability was premised on Rule 10b-5(a) and (c), as defendants
were not alleged to have made any public misrepresentations.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the
plaintiff’s claims, reasoning that defendants “did not issue any
misstatement relied upon by the investing public, nor were they
under a duty . . . to disclose information . . . .  None of the
alleged financial misrepresentations by Charter was made by or
even with the approval of the Vendors.”  See Stoneridge Inv.
Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 443 F.3d 987, 992 (8th
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Cir. 2006).  
The Supreme Court affirmed, but rejected a narrow
definition of “deceptive acts,” making clear that “[c]onduct itself
can be deceptive.”  Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 158.  The Court
explained that even if defendants had made a deceptive act, it
was not actionable because it lacked “the requisite proximate
relation to the investors’ harm.”  Id. at 158-59.  Accordingly, the
Court extended the reliance requirement, which was already
established as an element of Rule 10b-5(b) misrepresentation
cases, to actions based on deceptive conduct.  Because “reliance
is tied to causation,” the question was “whether respondents’
acts were immediate or remote to the injury.”  Id. at 160.  The
Court concluded the reliance requirement could not be met:
In all events we conclude respondents’ deceptive
acts, which were not disclosed to the investing
public, are too remote to satisfy the requirement
of reliance.  It was Charter, not respondents, that
misled its auditor and filed fraudulent financial
statements; nothing respondents did made it
necessary or inevitable for Charter to record the
transactions as it did.
Id. at 161.  It connected its decision back to Central Bank,
noting plaintiffs’ view of primary liability “would revive in
substance the implied cause of action against all aiders and
abettors except those who committed no deceptive act in the
process of facilitating the fraud,” a view rejected in Central
Bank and not revived in the PSLRA.  Id. at 162-63.
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Plaintiffs make two arguments with respect to their
scheme liability claims.  First, they argue the District Court
erroneously interpreted Stoneridge to bar all scheme liability
claims where the deceptive conduct was not publicly disclosed.
They read Stoneridge to have created a “remoteness test” that
requires district courts to assess (1) the level of the secondary
actor’s involvement in the scheme, see id. at 161; (2) whether
the misrepresentation was the “necessary or inevitable” result of
the defendant’s deceptive conduct, see id. at 160; and (3)
whether a defendant’s conduct was in the “investment sphere,”
as opposed to conduct that was in the market for goods and
services, see id. at 166.  The third factor derives from language
in Stoneridge’s conclusion:  “Unconventional as the
arrangement was, it took place in the marketplace for goods and
services, not in the investment sphere.  Charter was free to do as
it chose in preparing its books, conferring with its auditor, and
preparing and then issuing its financial statements.”  Id.
Plaintiffs argue Clifford Chance is liable because its actions
were relatively more active and substantial compared to the
actions of the defendants in Stoneridge; its conduct inevitably
caused DVI to issue the misleading 10-Q; and it acted within the
“investment sphere.” 
The Second Circuit recently addressed this argument in
Refco, a case with facts analogous to those presented here.  The
litigation arose from the demise of Refco, a large “provider[ ] of
brokerage and clearing services in the international derivatives,
currency, and futures markets.”  Refco, 603 F.3d at 149.  Mayer
Brown, Refco’s primary outside counsel, and Joseph Collins, a
     32In support of their remoteness test argument, plaintiffs rely
only on cases where defendants were corporate insiders as
opposed to secondary actors such as outside counsel.  See Pugh
v. Tribune Co., 521 F.3d 686, 696-97 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding
that Stoneridge precluded primary liability for an insider at
Tribune); In re Bristol Myers Squibb Co. Sec. Litig., 586 F.
Supp. 2d 148, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that Stoneridge did
not preclude § 10(b) liability for a Senior Vice President at
Bristol Myers).  These cases are relevant, but not directly on
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partner at the firm and the main contact to the company,
allegedly participated in drafting and disseminating Refco’s
public filings, which specifically identified Mayer Brown as
counsel to Refco.  The court rejected plaintiffs’ scheme liability
claims under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) based primarily on
Stoneridge.  “As was the case in Stoneridge . . . nothing the
Mayer Brown Defendants did made it necessary or inevitable for
Refco to record the transactions as it did.”  Id. at 160 (internal
quotation marks and brackets omitted).  The court also
explained that whether defendants’ conduct occurs in the
“investment sphere” is not “materially relevant” because
Stoneridge “was primarily focused on whether investors were
aware of, and relied on, the defendants’ own conduct.”  Id.
We too read Stoneridge to preclude plaintiffs’ invocation
of the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance.  The Court’s
statement that defendants’ conduct was “too remote to satisfy
the requirement of reliance,” Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 161, did
not create a remoteness test for private causes of action.32  The
point.  The question presented here is a narrow one—whether a
law firm can be held primarily liable for participating in a
scheme to defraud even though its role in the scheme was not
publicly disclosed.
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fact that the vendors’ conduct was “not disclosed to the
investing public,” id., is what made it too remote to invoke a
presumption of reliance.  As noted by the District Court,
Clifford Chance’s degree of involvement in the alleged fraud
was not materially different from the vendors’ involvement in
Stoneridge.  Although Clifford Chance was allegedly more
involved in the preparation of financial statements than the
vendors (according to plaintiffs, the firm created the workaround
so that DVI would not have to disclose the material
weaknesses), the vendors’ actions were relatively more active
and substantial because they actually “created false documents
that [they] submitted to Charter to further its fraudulent
scheme.”  Order on Lead Pls.’ Mot. for Partial Recons. at 5–6
(Aug. 27, 2008).  Thus, we cannot materially distinguish the
facts in this case from those in Stoneridge.
Moreover, no alleged act by Clifford Chance made it
necessary for DVI to file the misleading 10-Q.  Even assuming
Clifford Chance developed the workaround to avoid disclosure
of DVI’s material weaknesses, and DVI would have issued a
truthful 10-Q if the law firm did not present this alternative, it
was still DVI, not Clifford Chance, that filed it.  See Refco, 603
F.3d at 160 (explaining that Refco, not Mayer Brown, filed the
fraudulent financial statements).  That Clifford Chance’s alleged
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conduct occurred in the investment sphere also has no bearing
on this case.  The Court’s distinction between the “investment
sphere” and the “whole marketplace” does not affect whether
DVI was “free to do as it chose in preparing . . . and then issuing
its financial statements.”  Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 166. 
Second, plaintiffs attempt to establish the fraud-on-the-
market presumption of reliance is available to them under
Stoneridge by arguing that Clifford Chance’s deceptive conduct
was actually publicly disclosed—a necessary prerequisite of the
reliance presumption.  See id. at 159 (“[U]nder the fraud-on-the-
market doctrine, reliance is presumed when the statements at
issue become public.”).  They distinguish a “communication”
requirement from a more stringent “attribution” requirement,
asserting that Stoneridge does not require defendants to be
publicly identified in order to invoke the fraud-on-the-market
presumption.  Whereas in Stoneridge the investors did not know
about the vendors’ transactions and the false communications
they made to Charter, plaintiffs argue that Clifford Chance’s
deceptive acts were made public when DVI’s10-Q was released
to investors, which shows DVI investors necessarily relied on
the firm’s conduct.
Plaintiffs in Refco also made this argument in an attempt
to distinguish Stoneridge.  But just as the Second Circuit held
that a secondary actor can be liable in a private action under
Rule 10b-5(b) only for misstatements attributed to that actor, it
also required attribution to invoke the fraud-on-the-market
presumption in a scheme liability action under Rule 10b-5(a)
     33Like the Second Circuit, our decision applies only to
“parties who are not employed by the issuing firm whose
securities are the subject of allegations of fraud.”  Refco, 603
F.3d at 148 n.1, 158 n.6. 
     34Without attribution, the market will not know, and therefore
cannot rely on the deceptive conduct. Plaintiffs cannot use the
fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance, but they may still
have the opportunity to prove actual reliance on a secondary
actor’s conduct.
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and (c).  See Refco, 603 F.3d at 159.  Although Mayer Brown
allegedly drafted Refco’s misleading disclosures, none of
Refco’s misrepresentations were attributed to Mayer Brown.
Accordingly, the court held that plaintiffs could not show
indirect reliance on the firm’s conduct.  Id. at 159.  
We agree with the Second Circuit and hold that in order
for a plaintiff to invoke the fraud-on-the-market presumption of
reliance against a secondary actor in a scheme liability action
under § 10(b), the plaintiff must show the deceptive conduct was
publicly attributed to that secondary actor.33  See also Affco Invs.
2001 LLC v. Proskauer Rose L.L.P., 625 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir.
2010) (holding “explicit attribution is required to show reliance
under section 10(b)”).  It is insufficient to show only that the
deceptive conduct was publicly disclosed through other
statements or conduct; the public must be made aware of the
defendant’s acts.34  Our decision is guided by Stoneridge, where
“[t]he Supreme Court explicitly rejected the argument that
     35We recognize that an attribution requirement may allow
some secondary actors to escape liability simply by engaging in
all conduct behind closed doors.  We also agree with the Second
Circuit’s acknowledgment that “it is somewhat unclear how the
deceptive conduct of a secondary actor could be communicated
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‘investors rely not only upon the public statements relating to a
security but also upon the transactions those statements reflect.’”
Refco, 603 F.3d at 159 (quoting Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 160).
Here, as in Stoneridge, plaintiffs claims fail because they cannot
demonstrate they relied on Clifford Chance’s own deceptive
conduct.  See Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 153.
Our decision conforms with both Central Bank and
Congress’s response to the decision, which gave only the SEC
authority to bring actions against individuals for aiding and
abetting.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e).  “If Central Bank’s carefully
drawn circumscription of the private right of action is not to be
hollowed . . . courts must be vigilant to ensure that secondary
violations are not shoehorned into the category reserved for
primary violations.”  SEC v. Tambone, 597 F.3d 436, 446 (1st
Cir. 2010) (en banc).  In Stoneridge, the Court rejected
plaintiff’s view of primary liability in part because “it would
revive in substance the implied cause of action against all aiders
and abettors except those who committed no deceptive act in the
process of facilitating the fraud.”  552 U.S. at 162-63.  The
Court did not limit its rejection of plaintiff’s view only to
deceptive acts that were not communicated to the public,
lending further support to an attribution requirement.35 
to the public and yet remain ‘deceptive.’” Refco, 603 F.3d at
159.  But both Congress and the Supreme Court have spoken on
this issue, and both have declined to create or recognize a
private right of action for aiding and abetting.  See Stoneridge,
552 U.S. at 163-64 (explaining the Court’s reluctance to extend
implied private causes of action).  In Central Bank, the Court
explained that because “Congress did not attach private aiding
and abetting liability to any express causes of action in the
securities Acts,” it “likely would not have attached aiding and
abetting liability to § 10(b) had it provided a private § 10(b)
cause of action.”  511 U.S. at 179.  And, as noted by the
Supreme Court, secondary actors who aid and abet primary
securities violations can still be subject to criminal penalties and
civil enforcement by the SEC.  See Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 166
(listing criminal and civil enforcement provisions in the
Exchange Act).
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We hold that a plaintiff cannot invoke the fraud-on-the-
market presumption of reliance in a private action under Rule
10b-5(a) and (c) unless the deceptive conduct has been publicly
disclosed and attributed to the actor.  Here, because plaintiffs do
not contend Clifford Chance’s alleged role in masterminding the
fraudulent 10-Q was disclosed to the public, they cannot invoke
the presumption.  Accordingly, their claim against the law firm




For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of
the District Court.
